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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Is the hospital's Notice of Claim, properly filed in the Nevada
action, valid against the Utah personal representative pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-815?

II.

Is the hospital's claim, filed in Nevada, valid against the Utah
personal representative under Utah Code Annotated §75-4-401?

III.

Was the filing of the hospital's claim in the Utah proceeding timely
and proper in light of the particular and peculiar facts of this case?

IV.

A.

Was decedent's false statement regarding his residence

and the personal representative's concealment the type of fraud
contemplated in Utah Code Annotated §75-1-106, thus giving the
hospital a three year time period to file its creditors claim?
B.

Does Utah Code Annotated §78-12-38 have application to

the exclusion of §75-3-803 in the particular and limited situations to
which it relates?
Ultimate Issue: Did the lower court error in dismissing the hospital's
petition for allowance of claim?

REPRINTED STATUTES
§75-1-102. PURPOSES - RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
(1)
This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies.
(2)
The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a)
To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of
decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and
incapacitated persons;
(b)
To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent
in a distribution of his property;
(c)
To promote a speedy and efficient system for
administering the estate of the decedent and making
distribution to his successors;

1
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(d)
To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and
(e)
To make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.
§75-1-106.

EFFECT OF FRAUD AND EVASION.

Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any
proceeding or in any statement filed under this code or if fraud is used to
avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of this code, any person
injured thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the
fraud or restitution from any person (other than a bona fide purchaser)
benefitting from the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be
commenced within three years after the discovery of the fraud, but no
proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud later
than five years after the time of commission of the fraud. This section has
no bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a decedent during his
lifetime which affects the succession of his estate.
§75-3-803.

LIMITATIONS ON PRESENTATION

OF CLAIMS.

(1)
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any
subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations,
are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the
heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a)
Within three months after the date of the first publication
of notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with §753-801; provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the
decedent's domicile before the first publication for claims in
this state are also barred in this state.
(b)
Within three years after the decedent's death, if notice
to creditors has not been published.
(2)
All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after
the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any
subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, are barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented as follows:
(a)
A claim based on a contract with the personal
representative, within three months after performance by the
personal representative is due;
(b)
Any other claim, within three months after it arises.
(3)
Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a)
Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or
other lien upon propery of the estate; or
2
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(b)
I o the limits of the insui ai ice pi otection o. '
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent ^, t! ,
•• personal representaive for which he is protected by liability
insurance
§75-3-815.

ADMINISTRATION IN
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

MORE

I HAM

O N E STATE

• D i m oi

(1) ' All assets of estates being adr ninistereu
us state art
subject to all claims, allowances, and charges existing or established
against the personal representative wherever appointed.
(2)
If the estate either in this state or as a whole is insufficient to
cover all family exemptions and allowances determined by the law of
the decedent's domicile, prior charges and claims, after satisfaction
of the exemptions, allowances and charges, each claimant whose
claim has been allowed either in this state or elsewhere in
administrations of which the personal representative is aware, is
entitled to » eceive payment of an equal proportion of his claim i If a
preference or security in regard to a claim is allowed in another
jurisdiction but not in this state, the creditor so benefited is to receive
dividends from local assets only upon the balance of his claim after
deducting the amount of the benefit
(3)
In case the family exemptions and allowances, prior charges
and claims of the entire estate exceed the total value of the portions
of the estate being administered separately and this state is not the
state of the decedent's last domicile, the claims allowed in this state
shall be paid their proportion if local assets are adequate for the
purpose, and the balance of local assets shall be transferred to the
domiciliary personal representative. If local assets are not sufficient
to pay all claims allowed in this state the amount to which they are
entitled, local assets shall be marshalled so that each claim allowed
in this state is paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking into
account all dividends on claims allowed in this state from assets in
other jurisdictions.
§75-4-401.

EFFECT OF ABJUDICATION
REPRESENTATIVE

FOR

on

AGAINST

PER

An adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction in favor of or against any
personal representative of the estate is as binding on the local personal
representative as if he were a party to the adjudication.
§78-1?

i! ! ,

If a person against whom a cause of action exists dies without the
state, the time which elapses between his death and the expiration of one
year after the issuing, within this state, of letters testamentary or letters of
administration is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of an
action therefor against his executor or administrator.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this probate proceeding the appellant, Southern Nevada Memorial
Hospital, hereafter hospital, filed a creditors claim against the estate. The
hospital's claim is for medical and hospital expenses associated with the
decedent's last illness. The hospital initially filed its claim in Nevada, in the
probate commenced there immediately after the decedent's death. Record
pp. 91-94. Subsequently, the hospital filed its claim in Utah. Record pp. 1416. The claim was rejected by the Utah personal representative.

The

hospital filed its petition seeking allowance of the claim. Record pp. 17-18.
The lower court denied the hospital's requested relief and this appeal was
taken. Record pp. 110-113.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are basically undisputed and are found in the lower court's
Findings of Fact. A copy of the lower courts findings are in the addendum to
this brief. The original is located in the record at pp. 110-112.
The decedent died at the hospital in Las Vegas, Nevada, on
December 21, 1982. Upon the decedent's admission to the hospital on
December 6, 1982, he listed his address as 4001 East Sahara Avenue, Las
Vegas, Nevada, which is the address of Maycliff Mini Storage and RV Park.
On January 4, 1983, Mr. Jared Shafer was appointed special administrator
of the decedent's estate in Nevada by order of the Eighth Judicial Court,
Clark County, Nevada. Vicky Larson Carroll, the decedent's daughter, then
nominated Mr. Shafer to be the general administrator of her father's estate
in Nevada. That nomination was signed by Vicky Carroll on January 5,
1983. These facts are evidenced in the certified copies of the Nevada
proceeding, which is part of the record, pp. 44-97, particularly pp. 47-49 and

4
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an estate wherever filed. It is the hospital's position that its claim, as filed in
Nevada, is thus binding on the Utah personal representative.

The

argument also outlines the hospital's position that a creditor's claim is valid
and binding even if filed with the court prior to any publication of notice to
creditors.
Point III argues the applicability of §75-4-401 of the Utah Code to the
facts of this case.

This section provides that an adjudication in any

jurisdiction is binding on the local personal representative. The hospital
claims that the Nevada Court order, signed May 11, 1984, is such an
adjudication. The Nevada Court found that the hospitals claim had been
filed, but remained unpaid for lack of funds. The hospital thus argues that
the Utah assets are subject to the claims recognized in Nevada.
Point IV is an equitable claim, seeking to avoid the bar provision of
§75-3-803 under the peculiar facts of this case. The hospital claims (a)
because the decedent misled them by listing his residence in Las Vegas,
(b) because Vicky Carroll nominated the Nevada administrator and was
subsequently appointed the Utah Personal Representative and (c) because
Vicky Carroll did not give any notice to the hospital in Nevada of the Utah
proceeding, she cannot use the nonclaim statute in Utah to avoid the
hospital's claim. The hospital argues that the nonclaim statute, as a statute
of limitations, is for the purpose of promoting justice by preventing
prosecution of stale claims. This purpose would not be met by barring the
hospital's claim in light of the facts present in this case.
Point V contains two separate arguments centered upon the
interpretation of Utah Code Annotated §75-1-106 and §78-12-38.
The first statute allows claims by parties injured by fraud in
connection with a probate proceeding if filed within three years of discovery

6
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67-70. The hospital filed a creditors claim in the amount of $24,832.54 with
the Nevada Court on January 6,1983. Record pp. 91-94.
The Utah probate was commenced on January 26,1983, when Vicky
Larson Carroll petitioned and was appointed personal representative of the
estate.

Record pp. 1-7. The publication of Notice to Creditors in Utah

occurred in January and February, 1983, in Washington County in the Color
Country Spectrum, the local newspaper. Record p. 9.
The hospital was unaware of the Utah proceeding until November,
1983. It then filed a creditors claim in Utah on November 14,1983. Record
pp. 14-16. Vicky Larson Carroll denied the claim and the hospital filed its
petition for allowance of claim on June 8, 1984. Record pp. 17-18. The
lower court dismissed the hospital's petition on motion of the personal
representative.
The value of the Nevada estate was originally estimated as being
$60,000. Record p. 44. The Administrator in Nevada did not receive any
assets. Record pp. 80-81. The Nevada Court discharged the Administrator
after finding that he had received no assets. The court found the sole claim
against the estate (filed by the hospital) was left unpaid for lack of funds.
Record pp. 87-88.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I outlines the scope of review to be applied by the Supreme
Court in deciding this appeal. Since the facts are undisputed, the Supreme
Court is called upon to review the conclusions of law of the lower court. The
appellate court is, of course, not bound by the lower court's conclusions.
Point II argues the applicability of §75-3-815 of the Utah Code to the
facts of this case. The statute provides for the recognition of claims against

5
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of the fraud. The hospital claims that the decedent's false listing of a Las
Vegas address as his residence is such a fraud. Therefore the hospital's
claim is timely under the three year limitation provided.
The second cited statute provides an extension of all statutes of
limitation from the date of a decedent's death to a date one year beyond the
issuance of letters testamentary, when the decedent against whom the
claim existed died outside of this state. This statute is very specific and has
application in only a limited number of situations. As a result, the statute
has application in those situations to the exclusion of §75-3-803, which is a
general statute of limitations in the probate area.

ARGUMENT
Point I

SCOPE OF REVIEW.

The Supreme Court's scope of review in this appeal can be set out in
two well established rules.
First, this Court has held that in determining the correctness of a
judgment of dismissal, the Court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the appellant. Mevers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84 (Utah, 1981);
Davis v. Pavne and Day. Inc.. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960); Williams
v. ZCMI. 6 Utah 2d 283, 312 P.2d 564 (1957). It is believed that most, if not
all, of the facts in the instant matter are before the court as stipulated facts.
Therefore, it is not necessary to review the validity of those facts. The
review required will entail a determination of the conclusions of law drawn
from those facts. Should the Court find any facts in dispute then those facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the hospital.
It is well established law that where the issues to be determined
solely involve questions of law, the Supreme Court is just as capable of

7
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determining the question as was the trial court and thus the Supreme Court
is not bound by the lower Court's conclusions.

See Automotive

Manufacturers Warehouse. Inc. v. Service Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033
(Utah 1979); Provo Citv Corporation v. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803
(Utah 1979); Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales. Inc.. 645 P.2d
648 (Utah 1982); Olwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
In this appeal, the Court is urged to review the lower courts
conclusions of law in light of the established facts. The law will convince
this Court that the lower court's ruling was in error and should be reversed.

Point II

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §75-3-815 SUBJECTS
THE ESTATE IN UTAH TO THE CLAIM

PROPERLY

FILED IN NEVADA.
The purpose of the Uniform Probate Code was to simplify and clarify
the law and to promote the speedy and efficient settlement of decedent's
estates. The code was not intended to deny any just claims against a
decedent. It provides the forum to simply and quickly handle and settle
those matters, Utah Code Annotated §75-1-102 (1953, as amended); Am.
Jur. 2d New Topic Service, Uniform Probate Code §3 (1974).
A.

T H E NEVADA CLAIM IS VALID AGAINST THE UTAH
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

§75-3-815 of Utah's probate code provides a multistate scope to the
administration of estates:
Administration in more than one state-Duty of personal
representative.-(1)
All assets of estates being administered in this state are
subject to all claims, allowances, and charges existing or established
against the personal representative wherever appointed.

8
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(2)
If the estate either in this state or as a whole is insufficient to
cover all family exemptions and allowances determined by the law of
the decedent's domicile, prior charges and claims, after satisfaction
of the exemptions, allowances and charges, each claimant whose
claim has been allowed either in this state or elsewhere in
administrations of which the personal representative is aware, is
entitled to receive payment of an equal proportion of his claim. If a
preference or security in regard to a claim is allowed in another
jurisdiction but not in this state, the creditor so benefited is to receive
dividends from local assets only upon the balance of his claim after
deducting the amount of the benefit.
(3)
In case the family exemptions and allowances, prior charges
and claims of the entire estate exceed the total value of the portions
of the estate being administered separately and this state is not the
state of the decedent's last domicile, the claims allowed in this state
shall be paid their proportion if local assets are adequate for the
purpose, and the balance of local assets shall be transferred to the
domiciliary personal representative. If local assets are not sufficient
to pay all claims allowed in this state the amount to which they are
entitled, local assets shall be marshalled so that each claim allowed
in this state is paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking into
account all dividends on claims allowed in this state from assets in
other jurisdictions.
The statute clearly contemplates applying all of a decedents assets
to all the claims against him, wherever located.
It is an undisputed fact that Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital filed
its creditors claim in the Eighth Judicial Court, State of Nevada, on the 6th
day of January, 1983. See Findings of Fact #5, signed by Judge Burns,
Record p. 111 and also Record pp. 91-94. The Nevada probate action was
the first to be commenced.

Approximately three weeks later the Utah

proceedings were initiated. The Utah Personal Representative, Vicky
Carroll, nominated Jared E. Shafer, to act in her place and stead as the
Administrator of her fathers estate in Nevada.

A certified copy of this

nomination is found in the Record at p. 47. A copy has been included in the
addendum to this brief. Mr. Shafer was initially appointed as the "Special
Administrator" and, pursuant to Vicky Carroll's nomination, was
subsequently appointed as the general administrator in the Nevada

9
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proceedings. The order appointing Mr. Shafer as the general administrator
was signed by the Nevada Court on February 18, 1983 and amended on
February 22, 1983. A certified copy of each order appears in the Record at
pp. 67-70.
The Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-815 summarizes the
purpose and requirements of the statute:
. . . This section has the effect of subjecting all assets of the decedent,
wherever they may be located and administered, to claims properly
presented in any local administration. It is necessary, however, that
the personal representative of any portion of the estate be aware of
other administrations in order for him to become responsible for
claims and charges established against other administrations.
As indicated in the statute and comment, the local personal
representative must be aware of other state administrations in order for him
to become responsible for the claims filed in those administrations. Vicky
Carroll was well aware of the Nevada action, even before she commenced
the Utah action, as shown by her appearance in the Nevada action and her
nominating the administrator of the Nevada probate.
B.

T H E NEVADA CLAIM WAS TIMELY FILED

The claim of Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital was filed timely
and should have been allowed against the Utah assets.
The probate code nonclaim provisions (Utah Code Annotated §75-3803 (1953, as amended)) become applicable only if the statutory time
limitation has run locally prior to the creditors claim being filed in the foreign
jurisdiction. See Am. Jur. New Topic Service Uniform Probate Code §108
(1974). The time limitation had not run in Utah prior to the claim being filed
in Nevada. In fact, the Nevada claim was filed with the court before the
Utah action was even commenced and before the Utah Notice to Creditors
was first published.

10
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At the trial court Vicky Carroll argued that creditor's claims must be
filed after the notice to creditors is first published. Vicky Carroll also argued
that if there was no publication in Nevada, there could not be any proper
creditor claims there. See the Record at pp. 102-104, which is a portion of
the estates Responsive Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss.
Such an argument is not supported in the law, nor should it be allowed to
stand as a conclusion of law. See the lower Court's Conclusion of Law #3.
Record pp. 110-111.
The hospital's claim was filed with the Nevada court in a timely
fashion. In the event the special administrator did not have authority to act
upon the claim, the claim was still filed timely and should not be barred by
Utah's nonclaim statute. A general administrator was appointed in the
Nevada action and would apparently have had authority to reject creditors
claims. No rejection of the hospital's claim was ever filed by the general
administrator in Nevada. A failure to reject a claim within 60 days has the
effect of allowance.

See Utah Code Annotated §75-3-806(1).

The

hospital's claim was acknowledged in the Order Settling Final Account of
Special Administrator. A certified copy of this order is located at pp. 87-88
of the Record. A copy of the order is also reproduced in the addendum to
this brief. The court's order indicates that the hospitals claim was filed, but
remained unpaid because of lack of assets to pay the bill. The language of
the order seems to indicate a valid obligation of the estate and nonpayment
of the claim was for lack of funds, not because the claim was improperly
filed or rejected.
There is substantial reason and authority in holding that a creditor's
claim may be filed prior to publication of notice to creditors. See generally
70 ALR 3d Validity of Claims Against Estate Filed Prior to Publication of

11
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Notice to Creditors p. 784, et. seq (1976).

The very purpose of the

nonclaim statute is to give notice, thus allowing creditors to receive payment
for their just claims. No prejudice can be found if a creditor properly files a
claim with the probate court prior to the published notice reaching him. The
fact that a creditor obtains notice of a debtor's death from a source different
than the notice published in the newspaper should not negate his claim, as
long as it is filed with the court before the nonclaim limitation period has
expired. Re Estate of Tanner. 288 So. 2d 587, 70 ALR 3d 778 (Fla. App.
1974) held that it was permissible to file a creditors claim prior to the
publication of a valid notice to creditors. In so holding, the Florida Court
found authority for its holding in Arizona and Montana. See Davis v. Davis'
Estate 56 Mont. 500, 185 P. 559 (1919); Lowry v. Crandall 52 Ariz. 501, 83
P.2d 1003 (1938). The Florida Court quoted the following statement from
11 Cal. Jur., Section 425:
" . . . 'Presentation Before Notice to Creditors.-While a creditor is not
bound to present his claim until after publication of the notice
required by statute, the statute does not require a presentation to be
postponed until after the publication. The holder may anticipate such
publication, and present his claim prior thereto. It is not the
publication of notice which is the prerequisite to the maintenance of
an action on a claim, but it is the proper presentation of the claim and
its rejection . . . ' . . . " Re Estate of Tanner, supra. 70 ALR 3d at 782783.
The proper presentation of a claim merely consists of giving a written
statement of the claim, indicating its basis, the name and address of the
claimant and the amount claimed, to the personal representative QL filing
such statement with the court. See Utah Code Annotated §75-3-804(1 )(a).
The hospital's claim, filed in the Nevada probate, met these criteria. §804
also provides " . . . The claim is deemed presented on the first to occur of
receipt of the written statement of claim by the personal representative, or
the filing of the claim with the court."

12
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In its survey of cases meeting the issue of the validity of a claim filed
before notice is published, the annotation at 70 ALR 3d 784, §2 states:
".. . the cases which have been found to discuss this point are all in
agreement that a claim against an estate is not required to be
presented subsequently to the publication of notice in order for the
claim to be valid." (emphasis added)
The purpose of the nonclaim statutes is to provide a time after which
creditor's claims would not be allowed. Recognizing the validity of such
claims filed prior to the notice being published would not conflict with the
purpose which the notice provision was designed to serve. Id. §4.
The Utah Uniform Probate Code is to be "liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies".

Utah Code

Annotated §75-1-102(1). The claim of Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital
should be allowed under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §75-3-815
and the District Court's order dismissing the hospital's claim should
therefore be reversed.

Point III

UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §75-4-401 THE
HOSPITAL'S CLAIM SHOULD BE ALLOWED.

Utah Code Annotated §75-4-401 provides for full faith and credit in
multistate probate proceedings:
An adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction in favor of or against any
personal representative of the estate is as binding on the local
personal representative as if he were a party to the adjudication.
The notes of Am. Jur. 2d New Topic Service, Uniform Probate Code §154
(1974) concur that any states decision on an estate matter is to be
conclusive on the local personal representative. It was further stated that
this provision of the probate code was a part of the general attempt to unify
estate administration. The rational is obvious; if there is a vehicle whereby
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a decedent's assets can be accounted for, wherever located, and where the
decedent's debts can be promptly verified and paid from the total of those
assets, then the stated purpose of the probate code has been met; namely
the speedy and efficient liquidation and distribution of the estate.
The Order Settling Final Account of Special Administrator signed by
the Nevada Court on May 11, 1984, is an adjudication within the meaning
of our statute. A copy of the order is reprinted in the addendum. A specific
finding of the Nevada Court states:
4.
That one creditor's claim was filed against the Estate by
Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital in the amount of $24,832.54.
Said creditor's claim remains unpaid at the date of the filing of said
accounting since there are no assets in the estate to pay said
hospital bill.
This fact, as found by the Nevada Court, should be binding on the Utah
Personal Representative. As there were no assets in Nevada to pay the
claim, the claim should be paid out of the available assets in Utah in the
priority of a medical and hospital expense of the last illness of decedent.
See Utah Code Annotated §75-3-805(1 )(d).

This conclusion is wholly

consistent with the general purpose of the Probate Code.
The lower court's Conclusion of Law #2 is in error in holding there
was no adjudication in Nevada which would bind the
representative in Utah.

personal

The lower court's Conclusion of Law #4 is also in

error in holding that §75-3-803(a) operates to bar the hospitals claim in light
of the argument set forth in this and the preceeding point. The lower courts
judgment of dismissal should therefore be reversed.

14
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Point IV

THE BAR PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §75-3-803 SHOULD NOT APPLY TO
THE HOSPITAL

BECAUSE

OF

THE

PECULIAR

FACTS OF THIS CASE.
The hospital did not file a claim in the Utah probate proceeding
within three months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors in
the Utah proceeding as a result of the false statements made by decedent,
upon his admission to the hospital, prior to his death. The decedent
affirmatively and falsely gave the hospital information indicating that he was
a resident of the state of Nevada and domiciled therein. See the lower
court's Finding of Fact #2. The hospital relied upon that information and
therefore took no action to file its proof of claim in any jurisdiction other than
Nevada. In fact, the hospital knew of no other probate proceedings in any
other jurisdiction until several months after the decedent's death.
The hospital also took the appropriate steps in Nevada to file its
claim. It was apparent to the hospital that the Nevada estate presumably
had sufficient assets to pay its claim; the Petition for Appointment of
Administrator, based upon the nomination by Vicky Carroll, listed the
estimated value of the estate as being in excess of $60,000. A certified
copy of said petition is found in the Record at pp. 44-46. Several months
later it was discovered that there were no assets in Nevada which were
subject to the probate proceeding.
Vicky Carroll, the decedent's daughter, was appointed personal
representative in Utah. She was, however, aware of the Nevada action,
having nominated the Nevada Administrator prior to initiating the Utah
proceeding. Yet, she did not notify the creditors who filed claims in the

15
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Nevada action of the Utah proceedings. Her concealment makes her use of
the non-claim statute in Utah to bar the hospital's claim a fraud.
The nonclaim provisions of Utah's probate code are found in a part of
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-803:
(1)
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any
subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations,
are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the
heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a)
Within three months after the date of the first publication
of notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with §753-801; provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the
decedent's domicile before the first publication for claims in
this state are also barred in this state.
This shortened statute of limitations only has application on the death
of an individual. Statutes of limitation should not be lightly set aside or
ignored; however, they should not always be applied with strict rigidity in all
situations.

The present case presents a situation where a strict

interpretation of the statute would not be justified and would indeed create a
true injustice.
The Utah Supreme Court in Mevers v. McDonald 635 P.2d 84 (Utah,
1981), partially quoting from the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Aaencv. Inc.. 321 U.S. 342, 24849, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586, 88 L Ed. 788 (1944) stated:
The governing policy in this area, as declared by the United States
Supreme Court, is that statutes of limitations 'are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared'.
This case involved the 2 year limitation statute in a wrongful death action.
The Utah Supreme Court held in that case, " . . . the policy against stale
claims is also outweighed by the unique circumstances of plaintiffs'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

hardship, . . . " Meyers v. McDonald, supra at 87. The nonclaim statute is
designed to allow efficient estate administration and encourage creditors to
timely notify the estate representative of their claims. A late filing does not,
in the probate context, before closing or distribution of the estate, work any
hardship. The unique set of circumstances surrounding the hospital's claim
in this present matter would indicate that a similar holding is in order.
In Klamm Shell v. Berg. 441 P.2d 10 (Colo., 1968) the Colorado
Court stated: " . . . a statute of limitations is enacted for the purpose of
promoting justice, discouraging unnecessary delay and forestalling the
prosecution of stale claims. * * * (R)ather than promoting justice, the statute
of limitations would then become an effective instrument for injustice. When
this situation occurs, trial courts properly may turn to estoppel or fashion an
equitable exception to the statutory limitation period." Id. at 13. See also:
Brooks v. Southern Pacific Company 105 Ariz. 442, 446 P.2d 736 (1970);
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Honeywell 639 P.2d 996 (Alaska,
1981).
This Court is urged, because of the peculiar facts of this case, to
reverse the lower court's order of dismissal which was based on the
grounds that the nonclaim statute of Utah forever barred the hospital's claim
for reimbursement for expenses for medical and hospital care of decedent's
last illness.

17
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Point V

THE BAR PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §75-3-803 DO NOT APPLY

BECAUSE

OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §§75-1-106 AND 7812-38.
Two statutes prohibit the application of the probate code nonclaim
provision.
A.

DECEDENT'S FALSE STATEMENTS AND HIS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES
ANNOTATED

CONCEALMENT FALL WITHIN UTAH CODE

§75-1-106.

Upon decedent's admission to the hospital he affirmatively listed a
Las Vegas address as his residence, thus causing the hospital to
reasonably believe he was a resident of Nevada. Subsequently it was
established that the decedent was not a Nevada resident and his domicile
was in Utah. The Utah personal representative has denied the hospital's
claim on grounds that it was not timely filed in Utah. Utah Code Annotated
§76-1-106 provides that in the event fraud has been practiced, a person
damaged thereby has until three years pass from discovery of the fraud to
raise the claim.
Effect of fraud and evasion.-Whenever fraud has been perpetrated
in connection with any proceeding or in any statement filed under
this code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or
purposes of this code, any person injured thereby may obtain
appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution
from any person (other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from
the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be
commenced within three years after the discovery of the fraud, but no
proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud
later than five years after the time of commission of the fraud. This
section has no bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a
decedent during his lifetime which affects the succession of his
estate.

18
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The editorial board comment emphasizes the broad power this provision
may have:
This is an overriding provision that provides an exception to the
procedures and limitations provided in the Code. The remedy of a
party wronged by fraud is intended to be supplementary to other
protections provided in the Code and can be maintained outside the
process of settlement of the estate.
The decedent's false statements to the hospital upon being admitted
to the hospital constitute the fraud contemplated in §75-1-106.

The

personal representative claims that the fraud of §75-1-106 applies only to
"forged wills" or "presentation of fraudulent closing statements" and other
fraudulent events that transpire after the death of the decedent. It is agreed
that the fraud contemplated in this statute does apply to such situations.
However, the statute is broader than this interpretation.

The

language of the statute does refer directly to fraud connected, "with any
proceeding or in any statement filed under this code". However, the statute
also applies,"... if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or
purposes of this code". This latter claim does not require that the fraud had
to occur after the decedent's death. A reasonable interpretation indicates
that a claim exists for any fraud which tends to "avoid or circumvent" the
purposes of the probate code. If the provisions of §75-3-803 are allowed to
bar the hospital's claim, then the decedent's own false statements to the
hospital will have been allowed to circumvent the purpose of the probate
code and a great injustice will be imposed upon the hospital.
When the hospital learned the truth concerning decedent's domicile,
it immediately filed its proof of claim in the Utah Court. Record pp. 14-16.
The hospitals proof of claim as filed in Utah should be allowed and
declared to be timely filed within the expanded limitation period provided in
Utah Code Annotated §75-1 -106.

19
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B.

THE TOLLING PROVISION OF

§78-12-38 APPLIES TO THE

HOSPITAL'S CLAIM, TO THE EXCLUSION OF

§75-3-803.

The nonclaim statute, §75-3-803, is the general statute of limitations
for probate matters. The statute of limitations provided for in Utah Code
Annotated §78-12-38, however, has a very narrow and limited application
and should therefore control in those situations where it applies. Utah
Code Annotated §78-12-38 states:
Outside this state.-lf a person against whom a cause of action dies
without the state, the time which elapses between his death and the
expiration of one year after the issuing, within this state, of letters
testamentary or letters of administration is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of an action therefor against his
executor or administrator.
This statute applies only where the decedent died outside of the state of
Utah.
The hospital in this matter is thus entitled to bring its claim within one
year after letters testamentary or letters of administration were issued in this
state. The hospital did file its claim timely under said provisions.
This statute can be harmonized with the general provisions of §75-3803 on the grounds that §75-3-803 is a general statute which applies to
general probate cases. Since §78-12-38 is a very specific statute it is
entitled to be enforced in those limited instances where it applies. It should
not be deemed to have been repealed by the adoption of the probate code.
That such an interpretation is justified is well founded in the legal
commentaries. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes §257 (1974) states that a particular
provision in a statute controls over the general provision and that the
general provision must be interpreted as affecting only those cases as fall
within its general language a M that do not fall within the provisions of the
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specific statute. Sections 253, 396 and 397 also have pertinent application
in regards to this argument; these sections state:
§253.

Related statutes.

It may be presumed to have been the intention of the legislature that
all its enactments which are not repealed should be given effect.
Accordingly, all statutes should be so construed, if possible, by a fair
and reasonable interpretation, as to give full force and effect to each
and all of them. In conformity with this principle, it is not to be
assumed that one or the other of related statutes is meaningless;
rather, such statutes will be so construed as to give each a field of
operation.
§396. Judicial policy.
Repeals by implication are not favored. Thus, an intent to repeal by
implication, to be effective, must appear clearly, manifestly, and with
cogent force. The implication of a repeal, in order to be operative,
must be necessary, or necessarily follow from the language used,
because the last or dominant statute admits of no other reasonable
construction. Moreover, if two constructions are possible, that one
will be adopted which operates to support the earlier act, rather than
to repeal it by implication.
§397.

Presumptions applicable.

The courts will not presume that the legislature intended a repeal by
implication. Indeed, the presumption is always against the intention
to repeal where express terms are not used, and where effect can
reasonably be given to both statutes. The presumption rests on the
improbability of a change of intention, or, if such change occurred, on
the probabiliby that the legislature would have expressed it with an
express repeal of the first.
The Utah case of Utah County v. Orem City. 5 UAR 15 (Utah, 1985)
dealt directly with how our Utah statutes should be construed. The Court
stated:
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be
construed together when they relate to the same person or thing, to
the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or
object. If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding of
the legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be
influenced by another statute, then those statutes should be
construed to be in pari materia, construed with reference to one
another and harmonized if possible. Id. at 17.
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The provisions of §78-12-38 and §75-3-803 can be harmonized with
each other, without violating the expressed intent of the legislature when
these statutes were inacted. When ruled upon as properly construed and
interpreted, the limitation provision of §78-12-38 controls the filing of the
hospital's claim, to the exclusion of §75-3-803.
The lower courts dismissal of the hospitals claim on the grounds it
was barred by §75-3-803 should be reversed, as the proper limitation
statute in this matter is Utah Code Annotated §78-12-38.

r

CONCLUSION

The claim of the appellant, Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital, is a
just and proper claim against the assets of the Estate of Kenneth Carl
Larson. The lower courts conclusions of law drawn from the facts of this
case are in error.

The order dismissing the hospitals claim should be

reversed, with directions to allow said claim.
Respectively

submitted

this

?rc
o —

day

, 1985.
SNOW&NUFFER
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

i ^ f a j TuJvJ^

LaMAR /7WINWARD
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Southern Nevada Memorial
Hospital's Petition for Allowance of Claim
Order Dismissing Claim of Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital
Nomination of Administrator
Order Settling Final Account of Special Administrator

24

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

e

'

:

THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Ronald Vv. Thompson
Dale R. Chamberlain
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (801)673-4892
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H?321

CLtRK
DEPUTY

IN THE F I F T H J U D I C I A L COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
KENNETH CARL LARSON
Deceased.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
SOUTHERN NEVADA MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL'S PETITION FOR
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM
Frchate No. 2554

This matter having come before the Court on the
21st day of November, 1984, on the motion of Vicky Larson
Carrol, personal representative of the estate, to dismiss
the petition of Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital for allowance of its claim. The Court having reviewed the pleadings,
file, and memoranda of lav previously submitted by both
counsel and having heard counsel, the Court hereby files its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
From the memoranda submitted by counsel, and the
representations of counsel that the following facts are not
disputed, the Court makes the following findings of fact:
1.
Kenneth Carl Larson died in Las Vegas, Clark
County, Nevada on the 21st day of December, 1982.
2.
Decedent listed his address with Southern
Nevada Memorial Hospital as 4001 East Sahara Avenue which
is the address of Maycliff Mini Storage and RV Fark. The
location of property stored by Kenneth Carl Larsen.
3.
On the 4th day of January, 1983, Mr. Jared
Shafer was appointed special administrator of the estate of
Kenneth Carl Larson by order of the Eighth Judicial Court,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<r
Clark County, Nevada. On the 5th day Mr. Shafer was
nominated by Vicky Carrol as administrator of the Estate.
4.
Vicky Larson Carrol was not appointed personal
representative in Nevada.
5Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital filed its
claim in the Eighth Judicial Court, State of Nevada, on the
6th day of January, 19B3.
6.
No notice to creditors was published in the
State of Nevada.
7.
An administration of the estate of Kenneth
Carl Larson was opened in the State of Montana on the 18th
day of January, 1963, by the filing of a petition of intestacy,
determiniation of heirs and appointment of personal representative.
8.
Vicky Larson Carrol was appointed personal
representative of the estate in Washington County, Utah on
the 26th day of January, 1983.
9*
Vicky Larson Carrol, personal representative
of the estate in the Utah administration, published notice
to creditors in Washington County, Utah in the Color Country
Spectrum on the 6th and 13th days of February, 1983.
10. Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital filed its
claim with the Washington County Clerk on the 14th day of
November, 1963.
11. Vicky Larson Carrol, personal representative
of the estate, disallowed the claim as being untimely.
12. Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital filed a
petition for allowance of claim on June 8, 1984.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court having reviewed the findings of fact and
memoranda of law submitted by counsel enters the following
conclusions of law:
1.
Provisions of U.C.A. 75-3-803 are controlling
to the exclusion of the operation of U.C.A. 78-12-38 under
the facts of this case.
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2.
There was nc "adjudication1' in the administration of the estate in the state cf Nevada which would
effect or bind the personal representative of the estate in
Utah or trigger the application 75-4-401. U.C.A. 75-4-401
does not apply in this case.
3.
There was no publication of notice to creditors in the State of Nevada and the petitioner has raade no
showing of facts which would make the petitioner's claim in
the Nevada administration binding upon the personal representative of the Utah estate pursuant to U.C.A. 75-3-815.
U.C.A. 75-3-815 has no application in this'case.
4.
Publication to creditors on the 6th and 13th
days of February, 1983 was proper. Since the petitioner's
notice of claim was filed on November 13, 1983, more than
three months after the last publication of notice to creditors, said notice of claim was not timely filed and is /
barred by the operation of U.C.A. 75-3-803(a).
/
/

5.
Fetition of Southern Nevad^ Memorial I^dspital
to all its claim is denied and dismiss

DATED this

7

day of
/

/

BY THE

K

WJA^CCT^

I , yi'98'

)UKB*

A/ui^^A^
J .J&I&Lm JBURNS
D^strixrt^Courtf\ Judge
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Dale R. Chamberlain
Attorney for Plaintiff
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone (801) 673-4892
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J J

v.

1

J I
ClrfiK

TtSC

DEPUTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH CARL LARSON

)

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIM
OF SOUTHERN NEVADA
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

Deceased.

)

Probate 2554

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF)

The above-entitled Court having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav, and consistent
therev.'i.'n hereby enters its order as follows.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Pep-ticm for Allowance

/J

•

y

of Claim of Southern Nevada Meftio^ial/Hospital is hereby
dismissed.

DATED this "^fcSP" / d^y^of / IMT^^YA
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2
3
4
5
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF'THE STATE OF NEVADA

6

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

7
8

In the Matter of the Estate

)

"

9
KENNETH LARSON,

10

)

NOMINATION OF ADMINISTRATOR

)

11

Deceasec.

~

)

~~

..

)

22
131':

The under signed, VICKY CARROLL, respectfully states

f;
141; that she is the daughter of KENNETH LARSON, deceased, and as such,
\
\

15 i being: the closest livine relative cf KENNETH LARSON, is entitled
16j; under N.R.S. 139.040(2)(b) to nominate a resident of the State of
17 '; Nevada as Administrator.

The undersigned hereby nominates J ARID

IBl E. SKAFER, Clark County Public Administrator, to act in her place
19

i

20!

and stead as Administrator having priority under N.R..S. 139.0-0
(l)(b).

21 .
22

^
VlcW/CAPvRDtt
w

~*

STATE OF NEVADA )
SS:

23 i COUNTY OF CLARK )

24 i
Or. this £
day of January, 1983, before D6, the
i undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the County of Clark, State
25 1 of Nevada,
duly commissioned and svorn, personally appeared VICKY
| CAFvROLL, "known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to
26 I the foregoing Instrument, and who acknowledged to me that she e:>:; ecuted the same freely and voluntarily and for the uses and rur27 i poses therein mentioned,
A
28 \
^-^-llVJu^
MtK_(ihji4
29 |
j
30 i

NOTARY PUBLIC i n and i o r . s a i c
and S t a t e .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. ^Reuben
Law School,
BYU.
3 > .Clark Notary
Pub'.icState cl Nevada
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Countv

2i
3
4
5
6|| IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
7||

STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK
* * *

8
9|| In the Matter of the Estate

)

1011 °* KENNETH LARSON,

)

1]\\

)

Deceased.

12

ORDER SETTLING FiNi
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

)

13

JARED E. ERArER, Clark County Public Administr atcr , as

14jl Special Administrator of the Estate of KENNETH LARSON, deceased
15H having rendered and filed herein en the 29th day of March, 1964,
]6j a full and final account and report of his administration of
1711 said Estate, and having with said account filed a petition
Igli for final distribution of said estate to the Regular Administra19

tor, and said account and petition, this day, having come on

20 | regularly to be heard, JEROME L. ELUT, ESQ. of JEROME L. BLUTr
21 ll CHARTERED r appearing as Attorney for Petitioner, the Court,
2211 after examining the said account and petition, and hearing the
23H evidence, FINDS:
241

1.

That due and proper notice of this hearing has been

25ll given in the manner prescribed by lav;
2.

26l

That said account is in all respects true and

2711 correct, and that there are no assets held by the Special
281 Administrator for the estate of RENNETH LARSON.
2911

3.
-~^^+o

That due and legal notice to the creditors of said

has been civen in the manner and for the time required
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4.

1

That one creditor's claim was filed against the

2! Estate by Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital in the ainount of
3| $24,832.54.

4

Said creditor's claim remains unpaid at the date

of the filing of said accounting since there are no assets

5| in the estate to pay said hospital bill.
E.

61

7

7hat the names, aces and residence of the

next of kin

81 are a c

of the decedent, so far as kncvrn to your Petitioner,

i r

VZCy;^ CARKOLLr a c u k c, u c h t e r
i t l f Friinera S t r e e t
Leriion G r o v e , CA 92 04 5

91

iol

o-i c e v

11

121

21 IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

I

1.

14

That the first and final account and report of

JARED E. SEAFER, Clark County Public Administrator, Administra-

151 tor of the said Estate, filed herein on March 29, 1984, be and
161 the same hereby is approved, allowed and settled.
17

2.

That said Special Administrator be discharged and

181 this special administration of the estate of KENNETH LARSON
19

shall be closed.

201

DATED this

// day of May, 1984.
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